

Crises Anticipation, Avoidance, Creating...

Decision-making with a short deadline

Emergency decision-making

Urgent problem-solving

Conjecture: In the major crises, the main risks and limitations have not come from data-collection or transmission capabilities, or from organization, or from staff failures, or from "misunderstandings" between opponents (of facts, intended messages, attitudes) (as often distinct from disagreements or conflicts). ^{or bad prediction}

Critical area is the decisions, judgments, role performance (asking questions, evaluating planning, operations and estimates, authorizing risky info-gathering, interpreting evidence, defining goals) of individuals, ^{at the top of the} hierarchy, and at the very top of the hierarchy, their performance, their direction, rather than the

Problem is not to replace them by "managers".

Is Our political system precludes that; it gives them, and their immediate appointees, responsibility and authority, and stakes their jobs and reputations on performance; they are, moreover, integrated with national security.

Yet: they are amateurs;

present opportunity encouraging fait accompli.

Desire of opponents to avoid or at least
postpone military incident or trouble — known to
public — pending an election.

This may make an opponent reluctant to see
trouble coming, to acknowledge a need for
forestalling or ^{openly} preparatory action (which would
raise the issue in public eyes, create apprehension,
cause questions about Admin assurances), thus
making making surprise + unreadiness more likely.

But actual fait may be a challenge to
action, however unadvised.

Also, Admin that expects to be replaced may
be reluctant to move. (Like in 1960; English more)

But, errors made by those planning a surprise, a
last example, leaving them vulnerable to counter-attack:

1) Underestimation of effects of causing anger by deception.
[Stimson in Bay of Pigs;] Khrushchev and Kennedy (like in Bay of
Pigs, escalation of moves); "provoking" responses.

2) Heavy deception encourages commitments (threats, pro-
fessions - commitment of prestige - lack of preparation, usually by
surprise).

3) Costs/risks of overestimating scale of operations, preparations.

Conclusion

[In both Bay of Pigs and Cuban crisis, the military were
represented in the Edloms only by the Chairman JCS.
Was this enough?]

Costs/risks of limiting staff work, internal criticism.

4) Possible force, speed, ~~and~~ nature of counteraction,
or ally
of opponent "provoked" sufficiently.

To enlarge sample of "crises," break down
crisis into "Acts," sub-crises.

e.g. list surprises; show which lead to

- { 1) counter-surprises
- { 2) violent action
- { 3) retreats
- { 4) acceptance

Possibility of "Slow Crisis": e.g. Saw "crisis" but 66.
to minds - Cuba? &

Important

- a) Deadline (not necessarily "short" see d))
- b) Problem-solving
- c) Deadline short relative to the difficulty of
solution, time "normally" required to accomplish
solution (with normal procedures, organization &
go through processes of estimating, planning, etc.) but
as far as to remove challenge that extraordinary
problem "holders" "moderate."

Factors that make surprise more achievable by
opponent:

a) Intell. analysts ignorance of political or
technical factors ^{that may} inhibiting fact or effective response

(no belief that opponent "would be sure of prompt,
effective response — so wouldn't try." Castro
should not be taken as example of "OK, he made a
big mistake — was wrong — he won't try it
again" (Kent?) ignoring factors (including wrong
beliefs: US intentions?) that could have validated
my expectations.

b) Underestimate enemy's ability for secrecy.

c) " " willingness to deceive (e.g. allies).

d) " " speed of deployment, cooperation

(US didn't understand this in Iraq)

All of these figured in all of the surprises, and
all of the retreats.

(Did they overestimate risks and, ~~will~~
advantages of stopping, underestimate costs of stopping
(Eden & Llewellyn: thought they had taken most of Canal)
+ of failure?)

2) Pressures that can be brought to bear,
once approval is lost, by public (English & Llewellyn)
gov opposition, (Llewellyn, Big of Pigs), Allies (US in Llewellyn,
enemy (US in Cuba; SC in Llewellyn))

3) Humiliation, demoralization & fear of anger, loss of
moral superiority, as result of deception of
public & allies, as well as enemy (all of whom are
angry at being deceived & being made fools of by their
own predictions, commitments)

"Commitment"

Would underestimating requirements of warfare, first...
to risks, allied reactions, collateral damage, etc —
e.g. by military, intelligence — be enough to
get Head of State to agree to "small, part"
operation which he would then be committed to
following through, by fear of failure and hope of
success?

Example of success in this? Counterexamples:

- a) K's retreat in Cuba
- b) British-French retreat in Bay (What was British goal? Was it achieved?)
- c) JFK retreat in Bay of Pigs.

(I+R, Bpt 19, 62?)

Military underestimate: 1) Willingness of Head of State to
accept defeat in face of "worse" consequences. Then
each of these retreats over-keaty, loss of nerve, head in fog?
(What was intent of RFK threat?) in face of crisis

b) Facts accomplish desired; covert preparations

c) But not covert, "deniable" operations

d) Though, since ^{guilt over} fact accomplish, deception, collateral damage; desire to minimize collateral damage —

this Aug, Bay of Pigs, US 14-28 Oct (Sovs
didn't contemplate violence :) ^{Special notions: Aug. 1961:}
^{Arab allies, US feelings; US: Bay of Pigs, Castro's capture??}

this + desire for fact accomplish, limited moves —

~~dangerously~~ ~~or~~ dangerously? (Aug? Early plans
in Oct 14-22 Oct?)

Were plans for "precise demonstrations" — mentioned
by Page — a feature of "present crisis", early?

+ (in Bay of Pigs — and early plans to "erase mistakes
in Cuba — desire to deny operations", kept plans
extra small & ineffective but provocative and
limiting.

Faits accomplis

Bay of Pigs:

1) US sense of deadline: opportunity; May too late
April certain to work.

2) Handled like crisis: ~~having~~ small number of
decision-makers, not because of speed but because
of secrecy: 2) clandestine 4) fait accompli (hedge
against loss of secrecy?)

① (British-French at Dunkles at Sixty; US on
Oct 14; SU on Cuban missiles:

2) Selecting opportunity crises

① "Provocation," ^{elimination of legal means} US elections

② chance of small airstrike, justified by SU deception,
covered by SU secrecy + deception, before
large deployment;

SU movement, SAMs operational (Was this
a factor in urgency?)

③ or, chance of ^(mistake?)
offensive blockade, before everything had arrived;
invasion, before MRCMs, IRCMs operational

④ last chance for move to make a difference, before
MRMs appeared; US elections? SS-7s?

McNamara: Johnson's first draft of PWS speech:

"These missiles make no difference to the military situation; but you can't treat the US that way." But there were too many people in the CW who would have said, "If that's all that's involved, I'd just as soon be a second class power" (Allies).

Relation between prestige/reputation/respect of Head of State/Adm and the nation's influence and security. [But you get fast, violent, radical action when you threaten both; if you can manage to ~~then~~ threaten or hurt other side without humiliating or threatening internal position of other, you're much safer.]

(Note to Newtolt, Bandy).

Task? Provide new decision-makers with the relevant secret history they could not have learned in school, or in RAND, or in State, or in other jobs: ~~the~~

Help them understand their previous, outsiders' "lessons" of "crisis decision-making."

Provide them with true nature of past decision-making, instead of relying entirely on "on-the-job training" like the Bay of Pigs.
e.g. intriguing disputes.

[Did the have early crises, 1952-54? Anyhow he was experienced?]

What lessons does Johnson still need?]

Trouble: "everybody knows" past crisis history!

Note dangers of preconceptions, lack of offhand conversation.

Security excludes independence for real problems, wrong

ideas of problems, in new initiatives; and system fails

to provide them an education. Teaches techniques, not values

(Identify the key jobs that give a real role in

crisis decision-making; e.g. ~~the~~ decisions!)

Perspectives on intell. effort concealed by clearances

1) Large

2) Frequent

3) Selective; focused

4) Acceptance of cost, risk; aggressive.

5) Clear focus & model: ^{fairly} reliable, unambiguous, timely.

6) Organized

7) Controlled at top.

8) a major concern of high-level decision-makers

9) a major area of conscious, concealed, interaction between

10) continuous, pervasive influence on decision-making.

[Contrast: public view, including "elite outsiders".]

[Analogy: landmine activities?]

A revised BRSE has been reviewed & approved by the JCS and submitted to the SecDef for approval. [SEC]

This revision includes significant changes in national level strategic thinking. These changes deal primarily with increased emphasis on our nonnuclear posture, on flexible & selective responses, both onshore & offshore, to the entire spectrum of the Comm threat, and on contingency ops.

Def: GW: Armed conflict between the major powers of the Communist & Free Worlds in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

LW: Armed conflict short of GW, exclusive of incidents, involving the direct engagement of the military forces of two nations.

Incidents: Brief clashes or other military disturbances generally of a transitory nature & not involving protracted hostilities.

Free World: Those countries not under Communist control, domination or influence.

C 33 March 63

That: Sov leaders evidently believe that their
current strategic forces provide a strong
deterrent ~~force~~ against Western initiation of GW
and are sufficient to support an aggressive foreign
policy, particularly by virtue of the threat they pose to
Allies of the US in Europe & Asia.

[i.e. SU... has capability of launching large scale initial
attacks on short notice against a large number of European
targets & a large number of North American targets.
However, the SU cannot at present time save any
assurances that it could escape destruction from
Western attacks even if the USSR struck first.]

Sov can be expected to continue their aggressive
actions and their military preparedness.
Presently, there is an implication in Sov behavior
that they consider themselves in a position to attack
the West deliberately or to undertake local moves if
either of these actions carry with them a serious risk
of bringing on GW. This does not mean, however, that they
would always estimate the risk correctly nor does it mean
that they would abandon interests they considered vital.

in order to avoid grave risk of nuclear war.
These views do not exclude the use of available street
forces to launch a pre-emptive attack should they
conclude that the West is irreversibly committed to
an imminent attack or that, through enforcement situations,
there is posed an unacceptable threat to their vital interests.

It regards (large & theater field forces) as a part of
the deterrent to GW and as essential to the conduct of
GW, should it occur. It also regards these forces as
a deterrent to any limited action against S. territory or
on its periphery while serving ^{at the same time} as an essential means of
maintaining comm. regions in the S. Hemisphere.

4. The maintenance of large conventional forces permits the
S. to engage in either limited or local actions in Eurasia.
However, in the view of the S. leaders, GW anywhere
carries some danger of expanding into GW. This danger
may be great or small depending on the issues at stake
in the conflict. The S. also stressed the need for the conduct of GW
in a manner consistent with the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations.

The Lvs are probably convinced that in a C.W. between themselves & the West, the risk would be grave. Therefore, they probably would involve themselves militarily only in situations in which they believed that - (1) they would achieve success quickly & could control the risk of escalation, and in which their actions would not threaten vital Western interests; [Cuba?] or, (2) they could disengage in the event of a direct confrontation with the over-all power of the U.S.

c. Although the Lvs are unlikely, as a matter of general policy, to use their own forces to achieve local goals, they might do so in some area adjacent to Rlv territory if they judged that the political circumstances were favorable, and believed that the West would not make an effective military response. They could probably employ Lvs forces as necessary if some Western military action on the periphery of the Rlv threatened its integrity. [Cuba Case]

3/2.

Military, Overall military obj. of the US is to provide
for the judicious use of military strength as an element
of national power to achieve US objectives, avoiding
hostilities as long as such avoidance is compatible
with US interests, but being prepared to conduct any
war in a manner designed to further the interests of
the US and its allies & to defeat the enemy.

Includes the ^{US will} for achieving this objective the US will
EW: to defeat the S-S & the US will...

EW: to defeat the enemy in a manner best calculated to
bring the war to a conclusion on terms advantageous to the
US. ... In achieving this obj, US will:

- 1) Protect the interests of the friendly people involved.
- 2) Enhance Allied solidarity & effectiveness.
- 3) Provide for effective & max. utilization of indigenous forces.
- 4) Discourage future aggressors from repeating the same.
- 5) Control scope & intensity of conflict to minimize cost of escalation.
- 6) Be prepared.

6) Be prepared to fight locally in direct conflict with S-S & loc forces in order to prevent them with alternatives of disengagement, withdrawal, retreat, or expansion of hostilities. [US force and be adequate to preclude other alternatives]

7) Maintain adequate G.W. posture.

CW: 1) Deter S-S & loc use of armed force by being clearly prepared to win either CW or G.W. using weapons & forces appropriate to the situation.

(C+C)

8) Develop & maintain US C+C systems & com systems which will be promptly responsive under all conditions to governmental decisions as to initiation, regulation and termination of military operations.

That Concept

14. Fundamental US goal is the concept of employment of force provide for conducting military ops on a scale and in a manner which will force the enemy to terminate ops on terms advantageous to the US & its Allies.

Consistent with the strategy, mil. ops will be conducted in a manner which will:

- 1) Indicate determination.
- 2) Apply effective military pressures.
- 3) Provide a wide range & varied degree of alternative military courses of action.
- 4) Permit assumption of the offensive at the earliest practicable moment.
- 5) Minimize damage to the US, its Allies, and noncombatants.
- 6) Make every feasible effort to end the conflict at a nonnuclear level while retaining prepared to use nuclear weapons if required.
- 7) Make every feasible effort to prevent small scale conflicts from escalating into broader conflict (on C.I.C.)
- 8) Exploit potential of dissident groups & domestic influences.

6. This fundamental US strategy is influenced by the following considerations.

1) The US & its Allies now have an over-all military superiority against which all courses of action ultimately must be weighed. This strength is the source of our greater latitude of action in the complete spectrum of war on a world-wide basis even though we do not equal the S-S Bloc in certain specific categories of mil. cap.

2) The US nuclear forces operate in the environment of our over-all posture of power — a fundamental part of which is our nuclear strike capability. Our over-all military effectiveness will be enhanced by making it clear in all nations that our nuclear power is available for use at any time and that we have the will to use this power as required. Thus, the nuclear & non-nuclear forces combine to give the US freedom of action & the opportunity to choose from a variety of courses of actions not open to the S-S Bloc on a world-wide basis.

G.W.

a. GW might result from miscalculation or hostilities about of GW which were not initially intended by either side to lead to GW or, less likely, its might be initiated by the USSR with a nuclear onslaught with little or no warning [back to p. 170] for reasons to knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US is imminent or to honor a security treaty commitment, US forces may be required to take the initiative.

b. Detering principle is employment of nuclear weapons is that US must emerge from initial nuclear ops with clear military advantage. No attempt is made to prejudge the length of a G.W. [No "pleases"]

c. Adequate recognition will be given to fact that, even in a 2nd center forces will be required to conduct significant nonnuclear ops to provide for ground, sea & air ops where & when nuclear weapons are either not available at all times or where their use is not militarily required and/or is not politically feasible. Even under conditions of

of nuclear exchange involving the landwards of the
US & the USSR, use of nuclear weapons in certain
borderland areas may not be authorized.

(cf. SSOP)

2. Nuclear Ops

Concept. US, under conditions of GW, will launch a
nuclear strike attack, in accordance with the SIOF

3. Ops subsequent to initial Nuclear Ops [Rephrased]

1) ... will be conducted as provided by JCS, to extent that
comm & control structure will permit. However, command
must be prepared, in event of interrupted comm or loss
of centralized control elements, to continue ops, including
nuclear, C-3 ops in accordance with approved plans,
over-all US military objectives [USCP/BSNP] and
their own analysis of the situation

2) Offensive operations controlled by initial nuclear ops will
be attempted to defeat remaining enemy military
forces, to establish free & representative governments over
Sino-Sov & Sov population, and to attain other US & Allied
over & post-war objectives.

[US Policy on Conduct of War]

51 Priority of effort for Western ops will be in

Central European area. ^{- Better} Initial efforts

will be to liberate East Germany + Czechoslovakia. [New?]

In Pac, ops centered to defeat comm military forces and

as may be necessary to extend effective Allied control over

certain areas of mainland Asia. Ultimately, the presence

of sufficient Free World forces in East-Southeast Territory

will be required to effect a measure of control over the

S-S Bloc pop. [?]

20. Control & Flow of Resources

a. Security enhanced by landings; defence; increasing alert

status; pre-stocking facilities; in COMUS & abroad; increased warning time;

improved status & possession of power [Also CF; CIO; ...]

b. In addition to SIOB options aimed at selective attack on

bases of S-S Bloc power, other selective measures can be

integrated to influence the world-wide situation. It is

recognized that these other [Also options] could be

[Why always ^{defeat} S-S - but Bloc?]

significantly affected by the precision & completion of
our info on enemy strength & on the status of C & C facilities
surviving a strike nuclear exchange. Accordingly,
commanders will include in their plans a concise statement
of the risks inherent in the implementation. [S.E.C.]

These courses of action, designed to minimize destruction
not directly associated with a specific attack, include:

- 1) Withholding all attacks on certain countries
- 2) Attacking a restricted category of targets in certain
countries, e.g. neutralization of air defenses.
- 3) Cancellation of delivery systems used on targets to
be ~~defended~~ attacked: e.g. manned aircraft on targets
requiring precise delivery; and in other cases missiles used on
targets requiring less precision. [There was threat on C.C.]
- 4) Use of B.C. agents as approp.
- 5) Use of O.W. forces "

1) Ensure continued access to strategic areas and guarantee the determination of the US to honor its commitments and respond to aggression with appropriate means.

2) Force inhibit aggression to a level of only military in character when such action is in the interests of the US.

3) Retard aggression in consultation with available local forces, to permit necessary augmentation of US

& Allied forces; [e.g. - 1/2-5]

making every possible effort to keep the war at a conventional level, but being prepared to use nuclear weapons if required.

c. Elements of SAC specifically configured & earmarked for nuclear use when directed by the JCS.

23. Concept:

2. LW ops will be conducted on a scale and in a manner which reflects that the US will accept the consequences of GW. [?] Ops will be conducted in a manner which will accomplish the desired objectives yet minimize the probability of the enemy expanding the intensity & scope of the conflict.

Non-nuclear ops will indicate our determination and provide the option to engage the enemy forces on a scale of our own choosing before having to decide to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. However, our overall military effectiveness will be enhanced by making it clear in all actions that our nuclear power is available for use at any time and that we have the will to use this power as required.

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B. When US forces become actively engaged in combat
also in one area, appropriate action will be taken on
a world-wide basis to provide for:

- 1) A necessary state of readiness for all forces
- 2) Ops in other areas where our capabilities can bring
meaningful pressures to bear on the S-S Bloc.

C. Should CW involving the US occur, the US will:

- 1) React swiftly & effectively to neutralize the aggressor. [But...]
- 2) Be prepared to shift & expand the area of conflict
in such a way that US & Allied strength can be
applied more effectively
- 3) Exploit opportunities to liberate peoples &
territories previously lost through communist military
or political aggression. [collateral?]
- 4) Fight in concert with allies, or unilaterally if necessary

5) Limit damage within the area of conflict,
consistent with the achievement of military obj.

6) Mobilize resources, as required, and be prepared to
provide essential assistance to allies involved.

d. Significant limited military ops will be supported
from US potential capabilities by:

1) Expanding and/or increasing production from the
prod. base.

2) Minimizing financial limitations.

3) Augmenting from civilian sources, manpower,
sea & airlift capabilities.

24. Reserve Ops

See DOD Air 5105.17 (14 Feb 61), 5105.22

SM - 262-62, SM - 271-61

36. C+C

2. C+C of US forces will be exercised by the
Pres & the SecDef, through the JCS, by means
of the W-WMCS.

Continuity of ops. DOD Air No. C 3020.26

C+O: US mil. forces will be prepared to use C+O
insofar as the extent and use will enhance the
effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision to
use C+O info. will be made by the Pres, subject
for use of such, including & riot control agents in
approp. mil. ops, & riot control agents in suppressing
civil disorders.

CINCS and CINCPAC (US) authorized to determine time

conditions for employment and to direct military
operations

of the S.

2) Attack taking position to point of land - slow
no action.

3) Take cognizance of all land positions but do not allow
Militarism to impede normal US unilateral action
to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

4) As concern to close mind intervention not
necessary in order of priority for nuclear weapons
intervention are:

1) Reduce engaged enemy to 1/5 of forces.

2) Reduce enemy military power directly supporting
engaged forces.

3) See in such a manner as to ensure Dis-credit
attribution that the US is willing to expand the level
of conflict as necessary.

4) In accomplishing the foregoing:

i. Limit nuclear strikes to military targets

Treat the USSR if hostile, and if consistent
with US policy.